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ABSTRACT 
European Union conditionality has important effects upon Croatia and 
Turkey which have been part of the ongoing enlargement process. The two 
countries have been concentrated on the adoption and implementation of the 
acquis. In this process, several conditions such as EU’s new enlargement 
strategy or each country’s specific conditions, have affected countries’ status 
in the accession negotiations. This paper aims to highlight EU’s perspective in 
the accession period and intends to underline different messages of the Union 
regarding to the candidate countries. In the paper, it is argued that these 
messages may severely affect countries’ Europeanisation process as well as 
other factors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
Croatia and Turkey, as two candidate countries of the European 
Union (EU) ongoing enlargement, tend to place the main focus in the 
adoption and timely implementation of EU legal acquis. This process of 
alignment to the EU acquis generates important Europeanisation effect in the 
countries.  
 In this paper, I used the term “europeanisation” in the meaning of  
“transformative power” of the European Union, as defined by Tim 
Haughton.25 As also said by Neil Winn and Erika Harris, it may involve the 
process of implementation of European rules in a particular country, or more 
broadly the impact of their implementation on domestic politics.26 
 I limit my self with EU perspective in the paper and I intend to draw 
attention to the role of EU perspective in  Croatia’s and Turkey’s accession 
process. In the first part,  I state the difference of the ongoing enlargement 
process from previous ones for European Union. In the second part, I analyse 
Croatia and Turkey in accession process and in the final section, I argue the 
role of  EU perspective in the accession negotiations.   
 
 
1) EUROPEAN UNION’S  ENLARGEMENTS 
 
EU has experienced 5 enlargements until now. United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Ireland become members in 1973. The enlargement continued 
with Greece in 1981 after the country’s 6 years efforts, then Spain and 
Portugal in 1986 after 10 years efforts, and Austria, Finland and Sweden as  
relatively rapid affairs. These enlargements took place towards established 
political, economic and legal structure comparing to the last wave and it can 
be considered as relatively unproblematic. 
The fifth enlargement wave, South and East European Countries had long 
way to travel. Although support of EU began in 1989, the actual entry 
                                                 
25
 Tim Haughton(2007).”When Does the EU Make a Difference?”. Political Studies Review, 5(2), 233-246 
26
 Neil Winn and Erika Harris. (2003)“Introduction: Europeanisation: Conceptual and Empirical 
Considerations”. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 4(1), 1-11.  
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negotiations began in the end of 1990s and in 2004, except Bulgaria and 
Romania, ten south and east European countries became members of the EU. 
The driving force behind this enlargement has been the desire to ensure 
peace, stability and economic prosperity in a reunified Europe.27   
This enlargement brings new dynamics in the European integration and 
presents a new opportunity to take forward relations with neighbouring 
countries, namely Western Balkan countries. In the 12-13 December 2002 
Copenhagen Summit, EU has declared that it has avoided new dividing lines 
in Europe and determined to promote stability and prosperity within and 
beyond the new borders of the Union.28  At the same summit, EU has decided 
to organise a summit between EU Member States and countries of  Western 
Balkan region. Since 1999, these countries have already been part of 
Stabilisation and Association Process, which is the EU’s policy framework for 
the Western Balkans including both economical and financial assistance and 
contractual relationships.  
This summit has taken place at Thessaloniki  between the EU and the 
countries of the Western Balkans in 2003 and here, the prospect of European 
integration was consolidated for these countries. EU has declared that 
Western Balkan countries will become an integral part of the EU, once they 
meet the established criteria. “The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western 
Balkans: moving towards European integration” is prepared.29 The Union 
enriched Stabilisation and Association Process which will remain the 
framework for the EU membership of the Western Balkan countries. In the 
region, accession negotiations have been opened with Croatia in October 
2005 and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been still candidate 
country since December 2005.  
This enlargement wave is undeniably different for EU. In the 
“Enlargement Strategy 2006-2007: challenges and integration capacity”, EU 
lists some criteria for future enlargements indicating first of all that the 
current enlargement strategy outlines a renewed consensus on enlargement 
                                                 
27
 The 2004 Enlargement: the challenge of a 25 member-EU. 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50017.htm (11.10.2008)    
28
 Presidency Conclusion Paragraph 22.Copenhagen European Council. 12-13 December 2002. 
15917/02. Brussels. 29.01.2003. 
29
 The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving Towards European Integration. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the
_eu/sap/thessaloniki_agenda_en.htm (11.10.2008) 
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with a view to ensuring that future enlargements do not hamper the 
functioning of the European Union. The other principles are identified as : 
- compliance with commitments made and caution about making new 
ones 
- rigorous and equitable accession conditions 
- ensuring the support of citizens and democratic legitimacy of the 
process.30 
 
As also stated in the Strategy paper, benchmarks are introduced as a new tool. 
They are set for the opening and closure of each chapter and if they are not 
met, negotiations may be suspended or a provisionally closed chapter may be 
re-opened. 
 This strategy shows that EU has made all these arrangements on the 
basis of the lessons drawn from the fifth enlargement as also said by itself in 
the strategy paper. Progress of candidates and potential candidates is 
determined by their success in addressing key priorities. This shows the 
cautious attitude of the Union towards new enlargement and its intention for 
the standardisation of the accession process for candidate countries. Croatia 
and Turkey as members of ongoing enlargement process are the ones which 
are most affected from this attitude. In the next part, Croatia’s and Turkey’s 
accession negotiations will be discussed comparatively. 
  
2) TURKEY  AND CROATIA IN THE ACCESSION PROCESS 
 
Turkey submitted its application for membership on 14 April 1987 
and obtained status of candidate at the Helsinki European Council of 
December 1999. In its recommendation of 6 October 2004, the 
Commission said that it considered that Turkey “sufficiently” fulfilled the 
Copenhagen criteria.31 It recommended commencing accession 
negotiations with Turkey. The negotiations began on October 2005 (18 
years after application) but they have been subject to certain conditions. 
                                                 
30
 Enlargement Strategy 2006-2007: challenges and integration capacity. 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50025.htm (11.10.2008) 
31
 Turkey:the Commission recommends opening accession negotiations. 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50015.htm (11.10.2008) 
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Although the Commission acknowledged that Turkey has made 
substantial progress with political reform through constitutional and 
legislative changes, it stressed that the Law on Association, the New Penal 
Code and the Law on Intermediate Courts of Appeal have not yet entered 
into force. Moreover, the Code on Criminal Procedure, the legislation 
establishing the judicial police and the law on execution of punishments 
have yet to be adopted. Commission also underlined that implementation 
measures need to be further consolidated and broadened. 
In the light of these, Commission proposed a three-pillar accession 
strategy for Turkey. Accordingly, the first pillar, concerns cooperation to 
support the reform process in Turkey. The EU will therefore monitor the 
progress closely through revised Accession Partnership Documents. Most 
importantly, the Commission may also recommend suspending the 
negotiations if there is a serious and persistent breach of the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
or the rule of law on which the Union is founded. The second pillar 
concerns the “specific” way in which accession negotiations with Turkey 
are to be approached. They will be held in the framework of an 
“Intergovernmental Conference” consisting of all Member States of the 
EU. For each chapter, Council must lay down benchmarks for the 
provisional closure of negotiations. The Commission also considered 
“permanent” safeguards concerning the free movement of workers. The 
third pillar entails enhanced political and cultural dialogue between the 
people of the EU member states and Turkey.  
Croatia applied for EU membership on 21 February 2003. The June 2004 
European Council officially recognized the country as an accession candidate 
and in November 2004 the Commission recommended opening negotiations. 
The December 2004 European Council concluded that accession negotiations 
with Croatia should start on 17 March 2005. The prerequisite for this was full 
cooperation of Croatia with International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). This means to provide the arrest of General Gotovina and 
his transfer to the Hague. However, accession negotiations postponed 
indefinitely, as announced by the Council of Ministers on March 2005, 
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because the country had not fully cooperated with the ICTY. Following a 
positive assessment on 3 October 2005 from ICTY Chief Prosecutor that 
cooperation was now full and the very same day Council decided to open 
accession negotiations (2 years after the application). However, the Council 
indicated that less than full cooperation with ICTY “at any stage” would affect 
the overall process of negotiations and could be ground for their suspension.32 
Ante Gotovina was finally arrested on December 2005 in Spain. 
Both countries have been started to the accession negotiations within the 
framework of Accession Partnership Documents which are the main 
instruments providing countries with guidance in its preparations for 
accession. In these documents EU sets  short-term (1-2 years) and medium-
term  (3-4 years) priorities concerning the countries. Short-term priorities set 
for Turkey as democracy and rule of law, public administration reforms, 
human right, protection of minorities, civil and political rights, economic and 
social rights, regional issues and international obligations (namely Cyprus 
issue). Medium-term priorities set as mostly on economical issues like 
privatisation, agricultural sector and social security system. In the case of 
Croatia, short-term priorities set as   to reform the judicial system, the fight 
against and prevention of corruption, the implementation of the 
Constitutional Law on National Minorities, particularly in terms of 
representation of them, refugee return, reconciling the regional peoples, 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), resolving bilateral issues, with neighbouring countries, 
and effective implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. 
Medium-term priorities set as economical issues again. 
Regarding to the Accession Partnership Documents and priorities set 
in these documents, it can be said that objective elements are applied for both 
countries and EU’s demands are quite similar.  Cyprus issue for Turkey and 
cooperation with ICTY for Croatia, as sensitive issues of the countries, were 
set among short-term priorities. There are  benchmarks for opening and 
closing of the chapters but there is not “permanent” safeguard clauses for 
                                                 
32
 EU-Croatia Relations: Main Steps Towards the EU. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-
countries/croatia/eu_croatia_relations_en.htm (11.10.2008) 
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Croatia. It is obvious that from the beginning onwards, Turkey’s situation is 
more complicated and problematic than Croatia. Turkey’s membership is 
undeniably more difficult and costly for EU and it will severely hamper 
functioning of the EU. Turkey’s area is 78362 km2 and population is 74 
million. Croatia’s area is 56,594 km2 and population is 4443 million. Both 
countries receives financial assistance under the Instruments for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA). Turkey is benefiting from IPA 2256 million euro 
for the period 2008-2010 (including 2007) and Croatia is benefiting 589.9 
million euro for the same period.33 Despite of the fact that Croatia has not 
been a big problem for EU digesting capacity, country’s today’s performance 
is also related to its compliance with EU conditionality better than Turkey.  It 
clearly shows its intention for cooperation with ICTY in the case of General 
Gotovina contrary to Turkey which still has not fully implemented 
Additional Protocol to the Agreement which provides the removal of all 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, as demanded by the declaration of 
European Community and its Member States of 21 September 2005.34 
The speed of the two countries regarding to the accession negotiations 
are quite remarkable if we look at the negotiations chapters. Turkey has 7 
opened chapters, 1 chapter is provisionally closed and 8 chapters have been 
suspended. Croatia has 17 opened chapters, 3 chapters are provisionally 
closed, although these two countries began at the same time to the accession 
negotiations. As already said, there are certainly many aspects of this 
difference arising from the political, economic and social conditions of the 
countries however, here, I want underline the effect of EU discourse in this 
process. For this reason, I will focus the “messages” of EU regarding to these 
countries. 
 
 
3) MESSAGES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION   
                                                 
33
 Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) Multinannual Indicative Financial Framework for 2008-
2010. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/countries/ipa_miff_081106_en.pdf (12.10.2008) 
34
 Declaration by the European Community and its Member States. C/05/243. Brussels 21 September 
2005. 12541/05 (Presse 243). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/d-
tr20051123_13/d-tr20051123_13en.pdf (11.10.2008) 
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Croatia was part of federal Yugoslavia before and after World War II. 
The country declared independence in June 1991 and EU established 
diplomatic relations with Zagreb in 1992. So from the beginning on wards EU 
has supported the country. On March 2005, in the eve of taking decision 
about opening of accession negotiations with Croatia, EU avoided to 
discourage country. During Luxembourg’s Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister stated that even if it is 
possible to postpone accession negotiations with Croatia, the door of EU 
would stay open for Croatia.35 
On the other hand, there is no single picture of Turkey within the EU 
and mostly past hostilities form part of a negative but nonetheless common 
experience, as said by Andreas Marchetti.36  As indicated in an article by Ellen 
Svendsen, there has been a general negativity of media coverage if it comes to 
Turkey combined with an underlying fear of Islam.37 Although the accession 
negotiation began in October 2005, there is no clear timetable and 
membership perspective for Turkey. Furthermore discourses offering 
alternatives to membership for Turkey such as privileged partnership have 
resulted a serious decline of popular support for EU membership in the 
country. However, as indicated in Communication Western Balkans: 
Enhancing the European Perspective, public opinion in the Western Balkans 
is largely favourable to EU integration.38 All governments have committed 
themselves to this objective and are implementing reforms. 
 
In the EU, there has been always opposition against Turkey. French 
President Nicholas Sarkozy has made it clear several times that Turkey is not 
a European country and it has no place in the EU.39 In one of his campaign 
                                                 
35
 “Avrupa Kaps Hrvatistan’a Açk Olacak”. http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=37985&l=1 
(11.10.2008) 
36
 Andreas Marchetti (2008) “The Continuing Power Struggle in Turkey: Interpretation in European Union 
Media”. ZEI EU-Turkey Monitor. 4(2), p.6.  
37
 Ellen Svendsen (2008). “The Turks Arrive! European Media and Public Perceptions of Turkey”. ZEI EU-
Turkey Monitor. 2(3), p.3 
38
 Western Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective. COM (2008) 127, Brussels 05.03.2008. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/balkans_communication/western_balkans_communication_050308_
en.pdf (11.10.2008) 
39
 “Sarkozy Officially Nominated, Speaks Against Turkey’s EU bid”. Turkish Daily News. 15.01.2007. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=63974 (11.10.2008)   
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speeches, he had pointed to Turkey as the natural pillar of his Mediterranean 
project.40 Haluk Özdemir stressed that as a result of this attitude, in the 
summit conclusion of December 10, 2007, the words “accession conference” 
were dropped as a result of French insistence, instead only the formal label 
“intergovernmental conference” was used to define the process between 
Turkey and the EU.41 This unstable nature of EU-Turkey relations has 
remarkable effect on the slowdown of the Turkish reform process which have 
taken place from 2001 onwards and on the sharp decline of popular support 
for EU membership within the country. 
Contrary to Turkey, Croatia has been always motivated by the EU. 
Any kind of alternative institutional structure has been considered for 
Croatia. Instead, in the Enlargement Strategy and the Main Challenge 2007-
2008 document, EU clearly indicates that if benchmarks are met for opening 
the remaining chapters, progress in accession negotiations with Croatia is 
possible in the coming year (2009)42 It is stated by Croatia rapporteur Hannes 
Swoboda that if Croatia were to complete all the necessary reforms it could 
end negotiations by 2009 and become an EU member by 2011.43 
 
As seen, Croatia is one of the fastest countries among 27 Member 
States in relation to the accession and Turkey is the slowest. Besides of the 
objective elements such as differences regarding to the countries’ specific 
characteristics, the effect of EU’s attitude in this process have not to be 
undermined. According to a Eurobarometer Survey in 2006, Croatia’s 
accession is widely accepted in the EU. As indicated in the survey, 56% of the 
EU25 and 53% of EU15 are in favour of Croatia’s accession. 44 In the case of 
Turkey, in Autumn 2005 Eurobarometer Survey, 59% of EU Member States 
are against it becoming part of the Union.45 Consequently, being aware of the 
                                                 
40
 Schmid, Dorothee. (2008)“Turkey and the Mediterranean: An Ambiguous Relationship”. ZEI EU-Turkey 
Monitor. 4(2), pp.4-5. 
41
 Haluk Özdemir(2008). “The Union for the Mediterranean: A three-way evaluation”. ZEI EU-Turkey 
Monitor. 4(2), p.3 
42
 Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-2008. COM(2007) 663. Brussels 06.11.2007.  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/strategy_paper_en.pdf (11.10.2008) 
43
 Hannes Swoboda Says Croatia Will Enter EU by 2011. Croatia News-CroatiaPress.com. 09.04.2008. 
http://www.croatiapress.com/20080409-436.php (12.10.2008)  
44
 Eurobarometer 2006: Poll on endorsement/rejection in EU countriesof future accession of Albania, 
Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia. http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=tr&id=306 (12.10.2008) 
45
 Eurobarometer 66 Report.  http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf , p.223 
(12.10.2008)  
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fact that perceptions are quite important element of the europeanisation 
process together with objective elements, the role of the messages has not to 
be undermined by the EU if it wants to become a reliable global actor. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In relation to the transformative power of the EU, in other words,  
europeanisation of the negotiating countries, the paper argues that messages 
coming from the EU and EU’s treatment of the countries have significant 
importance.  
It is quite rational for EU to support Croatia which  membership will 
send a strong signal to other Western Balkan countries on their own 
membership. The new enlargement strategy of EU, “based on merit”, will 
encourage them and they will hope for membership once they fulfill the 
necessary conditions. Croatia’s accession serves EU’s strategic interests in 
security in the Western Balkan region which is bordered by Member States. 
For this reason, it is not surprising that Croatia has a roadmap for accession 
and clear indication of its future place in the EU. However, EU ambiguity vis-
à-vis Turkey’s membership persists. EU actors have increasingly voiced their 
concerns about Turkey’s accession underlining its size, population, its level of 
economic development, its “different” culture and religion. Open-ended and 
long term nature of the accession process for Turkey is overemphasized by 
the Commission. 
This paper claims that this attitude of the EU, influences severely the 
Europeanization of the candidate countries, namely Turkey and Croatia.  A 
key factor in the success of EU conditionality concerns the perceived costs of 
demanded conditions. So, if a country considers the cost of compliance 
higher than the rewards, then the transformative power of the EU decreases, 
as well as its reliability and credibility and vice versa.  Croatia and Turkey, as 
two countries which began accession negotiations on the same time, have 
been experiencing remarkable different treatment from the EU. In this 
circumstances, it is worth to emphasize the need for standardisation of EU 
treatment for each candidate country. It must be aware of multidimensional 
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nature of the Europeanisation process. This means that as well as other 
factors, psychological elements are indispensable in this process. EU has to be 
cautious about its messages in order to not hamper europeanisation of the 
future members.  
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